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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of foreign terrorist fighters is one of the most pressing issues
in this decade. In Syria and Iraq alone, 45,000 foreign fighters emanated
"from more than 100 nations around the world," 1 many of whom joined
terrorist organizations such as Daesh.2 Could these fighters have been
able to join the conflict had governments done more to stop them? 3 In
other words, what does international law require states to do especially
when they have a large number of nationals/residents involved in
terrorism abroad? Why are states, despite their sophisticated security and
border controls, failing to control the flow of foreign fighters traveling to
join the fight in Iraq/Syria? 4 Worryingly, some states may knowingly
allow residents and nationals to travel to war zones and subsequently be
involved in terrorism. 5 This might be encouraged by the incentive to
dispose of "homegrown terrorists." There seems to be a lot of confusion
about what is required of a state when some of its nationals or residents
are involved in terrorism abroad. States are either unaware of the recent
legal developments in relation to their responsibility in such cases, or are
benefiting from the vagueness and the lack of clarity about such
developments. For example, in Tunisia-which has a high number of
nationals with Daesh who fear a potential defeat in Iraq-there is a heated
debate between country leaders on whether or not they should allow these
nationals to return home after they have been involved in terrorism
6
abroad!
1.

PENTAGON PLAN TO DEFEAT ISLAMIC STATE TO LOOK BEYOND IRAQ, SYRIA, REUTERS

(Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-pentagon/pentagon-plan-to-defea
t-islamic-state-to-look-beyond-iraq-syria-idUSKBN163019 (last visited June 12, 2017).
2. Also known as IS1L (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant). Later it was also called IS
(Islamic State).
3. Many reports confirmed that states, including the USA, were not doing enough to stop
nationals joining such groups. Patricia Zengerle, U.S.Fails to Stop Flow of Foreign Fighters to
Islamic State: Study, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisiscongress-fighters-idUSKCNORT I VZ20150929.
4. The U.S. Homeland Security Committee, Final Report of the Task Force on Combating
Terrorists and Foreign Fighters Travel 23 (2015); see Cheryl K. Chumley, U.S. Veteran: Going
to Syria to Fight 'like Booking Flightto Miami Beach,' WASH. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2015), http://m.
washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/2/us-veteran-going-to-syria-to-fight-like-booking-fl/.
5. Tom Whitehead, Extremists Allowed to Leave UK to Ease Home Terror Threat,
TELEGRAPH (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/
i 2050779/Extremists-allowed-to-leave-UK-to-ease-home-terror-threat.html; see Alex Matthews,
Extremists 'Are Allowed to Leave UK so They Don't Carryout Attacks Here': Counter-Terrorism
Official Claims Police Face Dilemma over Whether Terrorists Are More Dangerous"Home or
Away," DAILY MAIL (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3359631/We-sold
iers-streets-London-contain-Paris-stye-terror-attack-mutipe-gunmen-says-police-chief.html.
6. Anon, Terrorists Returning Home to Tunisia, ECONOMIST (Jan. 19, 2017),
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21715033-unwelcome-homecoming-ter
rorists-returning-home-tunisia.
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Nevertheless, while some states seem to be confused about what
should be done, some states have been responding to the phenomenon
differently. For example, some states considered the withdrawal of
nationality or cancelling passports,7 especially from dual nationality
terror suspects abroad. For example, an Australian teenager was
"stranded in Syria after his passport was cancelled while organizing his
return, his lawyer says." 9 Nevertheless, such an action could result in
preventing the terror suspect from abandoning terrorism. Moreover,
when the state taking such action is party to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC)-as well as other conventions
requiring the prosecution of such persons-this might prevent the state
from carrying out its duty to ensure that such a person is prosecuted for
terrorism.
In this Article, we shall explore state responsibility in relation to
foreign terrorist fighters as far as its nationals/residents involved in
terrorism abroad are concerned. For the purpose of illustration, we chose
Iraq as a case study.l 0 To this, we shall first discuss state responsibility in
relation to individuals. Subsequently, we shall analyze the contemporary
legal regime governing state responsibility in relation to nationals and
residents committing terrorism abroad. Finally, the conclusion should
provide a synopsis of the study's outcome.
II. STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND INDIVIDUALS

Article 2 of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for
7. Alice Ross, Home Secretary Strips Man of UK Citizenship - For The Second Time,
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.thebureauinvestigate
s.com/ 2013/12/02/home-secretary-strips-man-of-uk-citizenship-for-the-second-time/; see also
Australian Associated Press, Australian Teen Oliver Bridgeman Who Claimed He Travelled to
Syria to Do 'Aid Work' Is StrandedAfter Government Cancels His Passport,DAILY MAIL (Feb.
26, 2016), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-346561 1/Australian-teen-Oliver-Bridgemanstranded-Syria-passport-cancelled.html; Nesrine Malik, Stripping Criminals of Their UK
Passports - Even Terrorists and Sex Abusers - Is Dangerous, GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2016),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfiee/2016/mar/01/stripping-criminals-uk-citizenship-rac
ist-sex-abusers-terrorists-two-classes-citizens (Other countries including the United Kingdom are
considering such measures); see also Somini Sengupta, Nations Trying to Stop Their Citizens
From Going to Middle East to Fight for ISIS, N.Y. TrMES (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/09/13/world/middleeast/isis-recruits-prompt-laws-against-foreign-fighters.ht
ml?r-0.
8. Sengupta, supra note 7; see also Fact Check: How Does Australia's Plan to Strip
Foreign Fighters of Citizenship Compare to Other Nations?, ABC NEWS (June 11, 2015),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-11/foreign-fighters-citizenship-around-the-world/6498920.
9. Australian Associate Press, supra note 7.
10. This is because there is clear international unanimity that the group (Daesh) fighting
the Iraqi army is regarded as a terrorist group.
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Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles) states that "Elements of an
internationally wrongful act of a State" require the following for state
responsibility to arise: "There is an internationally wrongful act of a State
when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to
the State under international law; and
(b) constitutes a breach of an
' I
State.""
the
of
obligation
international
To begin with, negligence of the state can be considered as failure in
its duty to take reasonable care to avoid breaching its international
obligations. This is because it could be considered as an unlawful
conduct, which gives rise to international responsibility.12 Thus, both acts
and omissions can be the source of international responsibility if they
were in breach of an international obligation. 13 This responsibility
continues as long as negligence continues in breach of the rules of
international law.
Furthermore, state responsibility for acts of private individuals is
already established. For example, if an individual attacks an embassy,
even if the act cannot be attributed to the state, the state can still be held
responsible for such an act.' 5
Nevertheless, even when there is an attempt to discuss terrorism
within the parameters of the above article, it will still be limited to the
prevalent incomplete scope, which repeatedly fails to see that states could
be held responsible for a wrongful act abroad through omission. This
study will discuss such omissions of the state in detail. Firstly, we shall
highlight the contemporary discussion in relation to acts of individuals
who can be described as agents of the state. Subsequently, we shall focus
on the possibility of considering the state responsible for acts committed
abroad by individuals who are not agents of the state.
A. Individuals as Agents of the State
If the individual committing terrorism is an agent of the state, the state
can be held responsible, as would the individual for the terrorist acts. In
this respect, Trapp concluded that "when a state actively participates in
an act of terrorism, . . . the one act of terrorism may give rise to both
11. Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
Commentaries, 2001, 2 Y.B. INT'L COMM'N 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/49, 34.
12. ResponsibilityofStatesfor Intentionally WrongfulActs, 2001, 2 Y.B. INT'LL. COMM'N
2001, U.N. Doe. A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4, 1-4 [hereinafter ResponsibilityArticles].
13. Article 2 of the ILC and many commentaries establish this fact. See, e.g., JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW CoMMnSsION's ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY:

INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES 82 (2002).
14. Responsibility Articles, supra note 12, arts. 2, 15, & 39. See also KIMBERLEYN. TRAPP,
STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 4 (2011) [hereinafter TRAPP, STATE
RESPONSIBILITY].

15.

ResponsibilityArticles, supra note 12, para. 4, at 39.
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16
individual criminal and state responsibility."'
In such cases, the state responsibility is clear and many scholars would
agree with Trapp that both acts and omissions of agents that give rise to
terrorism are sources of state responsibility.

B. Individuals Un-Commissionedby the State
When an individual cannot be described as an agent of the state (i.e.,
un-commissioned by the state) in any capacity, there are two scenarios either the wrongful act has a link to the territory of the state or not.
1. Un-commissioned Individuals Committing Acts Interrelated with the
Territory of the State
A state could be held responsible for acts of non-agent persons
(private parties) if there is a certain link to its territory. This is the case
when dealing with wrongful acts committed within the state's controlled
territory. As Crawford puts it:
There is no needfor state agents to be the directperpetratorsof
the unlawful act. In Corfu Channel[,] Albania was held
responsible for the consequences of mine-laying in her territorial
waters by reason of the Albanian authorities' knowledge and
failure to warn of the presence of the mines. In fact (though the
Court did not say this), the mines were laid by Yugoslavia.
Similarly, a neutral state may be responsible for allowing armed
expeditions to be fitted out within its jurisdiction[,] which
subsequently carry out belligerent operations against another state.
Depending on the obligation in question, failure to ensure
to the state even when the conduct
compliance may be attributed
17
was that of private entities.
Furthermore, in relation to the Corfu Channelcase, Crawford explains
that it "involved a finding that Albania was, by reason of its failure to
warn of the danger, liable for the consequences of mine-laying in its
territorial waters even though it had not laid the mines."' 8 The ICJ
stressed that:
In fact, nothing was attempted by the Albanian authorities to
prevent the disaster. These grave omissions involve the
TRAPP, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at 10.
JAMES CRAWFORD & IAN BROWNLIE, BROWNLIE'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 543 (8th ed. 2012).
16.

17.

18.

PRINCIPLES

OF

PUBLIC

Id.at541.
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international responsibility of Albania. The Court therefore
reaches the conclusion that Albania is responsible under
international law for the explosions which occurred... and for the
damage and loss of human life which resulted from them, and that
there is a duty
upon Albania to pay compensation to the United
19
Kingdom.

It is noticeable here that this ICJ ruling leaves no doubt which states
can be held responsible for omissions.
In the same line, a WTO Appellate Body report in the Canada-Dairy
(21.5 II), stressed that:
Irrespective of the role of private parties.., the obligations...
remain obligations imposed on Canada. It is Canada, and not
private parties, which is responsible for ensuring that it respects
...

commitments under the covered agreements.... The question

is not whether one or more individual milk producers, efficient or
not, are selling CEM at a price above or below their individual
costs of production. The issue is whether Canada, on a national
basis, has respected its WTO obligations .... 20
States have numerous obligations enshrined in international law
requiring them to act to counter-terrorism. Thus, if a state fails to fulfil
these obligations, and as a result of its failure an individual commits
terrorism, then this state is undoubtedly responsible. This is the case even
if this individual was not acting as an agent of the state in any capacity.21
2. Un-Commissioned Individuals Committing Wrongful Acts
Unrelated to the Territory of the State
Clearly, it is established that as far as omissions, which represent
breaches of international obligations, are concerned states could be held
responsible for wrongdoings of individuals. However, it is hard to find a
19. Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 19(2)
(Apr. 9).
20. Appellate Body Report, Canada- Measure Affecting the Importation of Milk and the
Exportation of Dairy Products, 95, at 26, WTO Doc. WT/DSI 13/AB/RW2 (adopted Dec. 20,

2002).
21. TRAPP, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at 64 (citing Report of the International
Law Commission on the work of its twenty-fourth session, U.N. Doc. A/8710/Rev.1 (1972), 317;
and Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, 22). See also Int'l Law Comm'n, Survey
of International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification, U.N. Doc. A/CN.41/Rev. 1, at 56
(Feb. 10, 1949) (referring to "failure[s] to prevent the use of national territory as a base for acts
noxious to the legitimate interests of neighbouring States... [as one of] the central problems of
State responsibility [calling] for elucidation.").
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comprehensive study where wrongful acts of non-agent individuals can
be attributed to the state due to omissions of the latter wherever the
planning, preparation and the execution of such crimes happened.
Authors would normally attribute an act (directly or indirectly) to the link
between the act and the territory of the state for it to be responsible. For
example, De Frouville, in his "'Catalysis" of international State
responsibility for conduct of private persons,' discussed the juristic as
well as the judicial backing for the idea that a state may be responsible
for acts of individuals because of breaching its own obligations under
international law.22 However, he did not discuss this in relation to
terrorism. Moreover, De Frouville limited his discussion to examples of
state responsibility within its territory as he discussed the responsibility
for attacking foreigners by private individuals within the state's
controlled territories. Moreover, he thinks that such attribution of
responsibility 23was not included in the ILC articles on state
responsibility.
Similarly, Crawford thinks that there is no need to rely on the ILC
articles (e.g., art. 8) to establish state responsibility for terrorism
committed by individuals who are not commissioned by the state. He
thinks that relying on the law of treaty as well as Security Council
(UNSC) determinations to prove state responsibility for terrorism
committed by individuals would suffice. 24 Yet, his discussion was fruitful
only as far as proving that harbouring or supporting terrorism by a state
would instigate international responsibility for independent acts of terror
groups.

25

Nevertheless, the ILC Articles are not useless when it comes to
proving state responsibility for acts of individuals. For that in the
commentary of Chapter II, for example, it is clearly established that:
4) [T]he different rules of attribution stated in chapter II have a
cumulative effect, such that a State may be responsible for the
effects of the conduct of private parties, if it failed to take
necessary measures to prevent those effects. For example, a
receiving State is not responsible, as such, for the acts of private
individuals in seizing an embassy, but it will be responsible if it
fails to take all necessary steps to protect the embassy from seizure,
or to regain control over it.[] In this respect there is often a close
link between the basis of attribution and the particular obligation
22.

DE FROUVILLE IN JAMES CRAWFORD ET AL. EDS., THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY, OXFORD COMMENTARIES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 275-80 (2010).
23. Id.at 107.

24.

JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART, CAMBRIDGE STUDIES

ININTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 167-71 (2013).

25.

Id. at 156-61.
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said to have been breached, even though the two elements are
analytically distinct.26
Such a determination is what many scholars and jurists failed to link
to international acts of terrorism. As the previous ILC Articles
commentary explains, the state could be held responsible for breaching
its own obligations in relation to an act of private individuals. There is no
reason why this should not cover acts of private individuals abroad. This
speculation is triggered by the recent developments in relation to counterterrorism state responsibilities. We noticed that many counter-terrorism
conventions and binding UNSC resolutions have emerged after the ILC
articles. Thus, it could not be ruled out that many of these international
obligations, such as those under the law of treaty, could provide the basis
for state responsibility for wrongful acts of individuals abroad.
Next, we shall provide a list of relevant state obligations in relation to
counter-terrorism responsibilities. In the meantime, we shall highlight the
delicate line between failing due diligence and fulfilling duties in this
regard. The main sources of legal obligations in this field are the law of
treaties and UNSC resolutions.
IH. THE LAW OF TREATIES

To combat the phenomena of terrorism, which represents a threat to
international peace and security, many conventions were convened. In
this Article, such conventions will be referred to as Counter Terrorism
Conventions (CTC). The CTC have been spreading both at international
and regional levels as follows.
A- InternationalConventions
Among the international CTCs are the 1973 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (CPPCIPP) 27 and the 1979
International Convention against Taking Hostages (ICTH).28 In addition,
as a genuine attempt to counter international terrorism, three important
international conventions were concluded for this specific purpose:
1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
26.

Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 11, para. 4, at 39.

27.

G.A. Res. 3166 (XVIII), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes

Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (Dec. 14, 1973).

28.

International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 18, 1979, No. 21931,

1316 U.N.T.S. 206.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol29/iss2/1

8

Bashir: State Responsibility for Involvement of Nationals and Residents i
STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONALS AND RESIDENTS

Bombings (ICSTB)29
1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT)3 °
2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). 3
Along with many other international agreements, these three
conventions have introduced a body of obligations binding upon states in
relation to terrorism. This body of obligations is expanding as treaties and
conventions continue to expand in number while introducing new
obligations emerging upon states in relation to terrorism. They all oblige
states to take all possible measures to prevent, suppress, and punish acts
of terrorism. Almost every member of the United Nations ratifies many
of these conventions. For example, all Member States of the United
Nations have ratified the ICSFT apart from two (Burundi & Somalia).3 2
Thus, the body of obligations established by these agreements is
undoubtedly an indicator of what international law requires states to do
in the face of terrorism.
B. Regional Conventions
Many important regional arrangements emerged concerning the fight
against terrorism. Examples are the 1998 Arab Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism (ACST); 33 the 1971 OAS Convention to
Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism (CPPAT); 34 the 1977 European
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST); 35 and the 1999
OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism
(CPCT).3 6
29. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 31, 1999,
2149 U.N.T.S. 256 [hereinafter ICSTB].
30. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 31,
2001, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197.
31. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Dec. 31,
2006, 2445 U.N.T.S. 89.
32. "UNTC," accessed Dec. 6, 2017, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?srcTREATY&mtdsg no=XVII- I I&chapter- 18&clang-_en.
33. Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, League of Arab States, 22 Apr.
1998, http://www/refworld.org fhereinafter ACST].
34. Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes
Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 1438
U.N.T.S. 195.
35. Eur. Consult. Ass., European Convention on the Suppressionof Terrorism, E.T.S. No.
93 (1978) [hereinafter European Union Convention].
36. OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Doc. AHG/Dec 132
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It is noteworthy that in most cases the obligations found in regional
37
conventions are similar to those found in international conventions.
There is judicial and jurisprudential agreement that a state is liable if
it breaches obligations under ratified conventions to which it is a party.38
State obligations stemming from conventions can be a requirement
either to act or omit. Thus, acts as well as omissions could constitute a
breach of international obligation under the law of treaties. Furthermore,
in the Factoryat Chorz6w (Jurisdiction),The Permanent Court of Justice
(PCIJ), held that:
It is a principle of international law that the breach of an
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an
adequate form. Reparation therefore is the indispensable
complement of a failure to apply a convention and39 there is no
necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.
In the same case (Indemnity), the court reiterated that:
[I]t is a principle of international law, and even a general
conception of the law, that any breach of an engagement involves
an obligation to make reparation.... [R]eparation is the
indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention, and
40
there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.
Thus, it is hard to argue that states cannot be held responsible due to
acts of nationals/residents, if these acts occur because of the failure of
such states to fulfil their contractual obligations. With this in mind, next,
we shall explain how to establish the responsibility of the state for acts of
private individuals who are un-commissioned by the state and beyond its
territorial control. To do this, we shall highlight the main related
obligations of the state.

(XXXV) at 1, 1999 [hereinafter OAU Convention on Terrorism 1999].

37. In many cases, even the wordings are identical. For example, the OAU Convention on
the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999 and the Arab Convention on the Suppression
of Terrorism, 22 April 1998 have very similar provisions and in many cases they have the same
wording.
38. JAMES R. CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 54056 (8th ed. 2012); see also J.G. STARKE, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 269-73 (11th ed. 2009);
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 566-612 (7th ed. 2014).

39.

Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 21 (July

40.

Factory at Chorz6w (Germ. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29

26).

(Sept. 13).
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IV.CONTRACTUAL STATE COUNTER-TERRORISM OBLIGATIONS

UNDER THE LAW OF TREATIES

The vast majority of states are parties to most CTC that require them
to adopt measures to counter-terrorism. These obligations include but are
not limited to the following:
A. General Requirements
The objectives of ICSTB,41 ICSFT,42 and ICSANT43 conventions
were identical as they all stressed the need "to enhance international
cooperation among States in devising and adopting effective ...
measures for the prevention ... of terrorism," and for the "prosecution
and punishment of their perpetrators." The general objectives in these and
in most other related conventions are:
To "enhance international cooperation among States in devising
and adopting effective and practical measures for the prevention
of the acts of terrorism"; and
To ensure the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of
terrorism.
States have to take a proactive approach in countering terrorism and
cooperating with others states (more so affected ones) in every
conceivable way to prevent terrorism. There is no specific limitation to
these requirements. None of the limitations identified by scholars, which
might prevent responsibility to arise, applies when negligence, omission
or lack of cooperation on the part of a state party allowed a terrorist act
to take place.
Similar provisions are found in other regional conventions. However,
some regional conventions limited their objective to that found in the
second point above. For example, the SAARC Regional Convention on
Suppression of Terrorism (RCST) took the following as its main aim,
which is to: "take effective measures to ensure that perpetrators of
terroristic acts do not escape prosecution and punishment by providing
for their extradition or prosecution." 44 Meanwhile, the Treaty on
41. ICSTB, supra note 29, at 197.
42. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, pmbl.,
Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000), (2002) ATS 23, 1999, at 2,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english- 8-11 .pdf [hereinafter ICSFT].
43. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, pmbl., Apr.
13, 2005, 2445 U.N.T.S. 44004, A/RES/59/290, at 2, https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/
Terrorism/english- 18-15.pdf [hereinafter ICSANT].
44. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, SAARC Regional Convention on
Suppression of Terrorism, pmbl., Nov. 4, 1987, at 1,https://treaties.un.org/doc/dbiTerrorism/
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Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States in Combating Terrorism (TCSMCISCT) took
cooperation as its main objective.45
B. Obligation to Prevent a State's Territoriesfrom Being Usedfor
TerrorismAgainst Others
Almost all CTC included some provisions requiring states to prevent
the usage of their respective territories for the purpose of terrorism in any
(e.g., Article 7 of the ICSANT). 4 6 In fact, in its article 18 the

capacit

ICSFT

7

convention went further to require State Parties to:

[C]ooperate in the prevention of the offences ..

. by taking all

practicable measures, inter alia, by adapting their domestic
legislation .

.

. to prevent and counter preparations in their

respective territories for the commission of those offences within
or outside their territories, including:
(a) Measures to prohibit in their territories illegal activities of
persons and organizations that knowingly encourage, instigate,
organize or engage in the commission of offences....
(b) Measures requiring financial institutions and other professions
involved in financial transactions to utilize the most efficient
measures available for the identification of their usual or
occasional customers, as well as customers in whose interest
accounts are opened, and to pay special attention to unusual or
suspicious transactions and report transactions suspected of
stemming from a criminal activity. For this purpose, State Parties
shall consider:
(i) Adopting regulations prohibiting the opening of accounts the
holders or beneficiaries of which are unidentified or
unidentifiable....
(iii) Adopting regulations imposing on financial institutions the
obligation to report promptly to the competent authorities all
complex, unusual large transactions and unusual patterns of
transactions, which have no apparent economic or obviously
lawful purpose....
Conv1 8-english.pdf [hereinafter SAARC].
45. Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating International
Terrorism, Treaty on Cooperation among the State Members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States in Combating Terrorism, June 4, 1999, Executive Committee of the
Commonwealth of Independent States, at 1, https://treaties.un.org/doc/dbfTerrorism/csienglish.pdf [hereinafter Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States].
46. ICSANT, supra note 43, at 5.
47. ICSFT, supra note 42, at 10.
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(iv) Requiring financial institutions to maintain, for at least five
years, all necessary records on transactions, both domestic or
international. 4 8
From the above, and as far as the case study is concerned, it is clear
that, states are under obligation to prevent their respective territories from
being used to support terrorism in Iraq in any way. This includes the duty
to monitor all financial transactions in relation to Iraq. This should also
be the case in relation to nationals and residents who travel to countries
that are used by foreign fighters to travel to Iraq. Thus, transactions of
49
nationals/residents who travel to related hot zone areas (such as Turkey)
for long periods are supposed to be closely monitored. A state would be
in breach of its treaty obligation if it failed to monitor transactions in
relation to hot zones. In fact, it may be a breach of its conventions
obligations if the state learns about suspicious transactions and fails to
inform the affected state (Iraq in this case). It would also be the case if
the state of nationality/residency failed to learn about such suspicious
transactions while it was supposed to know about them in light of its
conventional obligations. The state of nationality/residency cannot avoid
responsibility by merely claiming that it had not known about such
transactions. It ought to prove that it had been monitoring suspicious
transactions in accordance with its international obligations. 50 This
includes, as mentioned in the articles above, using state of the art
technological advancements to monitor suspicious or unusual
transactions.
Regional agreements have also obliged states to take all measures
necessary to prevent their respective territories from being used for
terrorism in any way. For example, The Arab counter-terrorism
agreement ACST in article 3(I) articulates that states must take measures
to:
[P]revent the use of their territories as a base for planning,
organizing, executing, attempting or taking part in terrorist crime
in any manner whatsoever. This includes the prevention of
terrorists; infiltration into, or residence in their territories either as
individuals or groups, receiving or giving refuge to them, training,

48.

Id. at 10-11.

49.

Turkey is said to have been a main destination for foreign fighters intending to join

armed groups in Iraq or Syria. Barbara P. Usher, Joe Biden Apologised Over IS Remarks, But Was
He Right?, BBC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-29528482.

50. The purpose of this Article is to highlight the existence of the obligation, which does
not require greater depth of analysis for technical subjects like this.
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51
arming, financing, or providing any facilitation to them.

C. Obligation to Detect, Prevent, and Suppress Terrorism
Some scholars discussing the duty to prevent terrorism have
recognized that there were some recent changes to the previous point
(preventing territories from being used for terrorism). However, there is
a lack of clear articulation of the recent developments in international law
in relation to the general requirement of prevention. For example, Trapp
stresses that: "there have been changes to the way in which compliance52
with terrorism prevention obligations is measured in the post-9/1 I era."
However, Trapp was still reluctant to forfeit the territorial component
requirement completely. In the sense that even if there was no link to the
state's territory, it may still be held responsible. In fact, some might think
that Trapp has gone beyond this when he said:
Attributing a breach of counter-terrorism obligations, whether in
the form of a failure to diligently prevent, or a failure to extradite
or submit to prosecution in good faith, raises no particular
difficulties. Prevention and aut dedere autjudicareobligations,
by
53
organs.
state
of
part
the
on
action
for
call
their nature,
Although Trapp discussed state responsibility for acts of private
individuals in light of this comment, she was still limited to cases where
the private individual is used by state organs such as intelligence services.
Contrary to what some might believe, Trapp's theory is limited to cases
of when the state uses private individuals to conduct terrorism activities
in order to avoid responsibility. Trapp, as did other international lawyers
talking about the topic, failed to consider failures of state in relation to
acts of terrorism committed by private individuals abroad.
Nevertheless, states have a duty to be active in trying to detect, prevent
and suppress terrorism. For example, article 18 of the ICSFT requires all
state parties to take numerous effective measures to prevent all attempts
to support terrorism financially.54 On the regional level where many
counter-terrorism conventions and agreements are established, states are
also bound to do everything possible to prevent and suppress terrorism.
For example, the OAS CPPAT convention required all parties to do
everything possible to prevent terrorism. Article 1 of the convention
51. League of Arab States, Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, art. 3, Apr.
22, 1998, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e4984.html.
52. Kimberley Trapp, Terrorism and the InternationalLaw of State Responsibility, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERRORISM 39, 44 (Ben Saul ed., 2014).

53.
54.

Id.at 47.
ICSFT, supra note 42, at 10-11.
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clearly states that: "The contracting states undertake to cooperate among
themselves by taking all the measures that they may consider effective,
under their own laws, and especially those established in this convention,
to prevent and punish acts of terrorism...."55
In fact, according to many CTCs, states are required to be proactive
and prevent all activities5 6that can lead to terrorism including encouraging
or instigating terrorism.
Meanwhile, Article 3 of the ACST convention prescribes the
57
following requirements that must be fulfilled by the Arab state parties:
3. To develop and strengthen systems for the detection of the
movement, importation, exportation, stockpiling and use of
weapons, munitions and explosives and of other means of
aggression, murder and destruction as well as procedures for
monitoring their passage through customs and across borders in
order to prevent their transfer from one Contracting State to
another or to third-party States other than for lawful purposes... 58
Article 4 of the same convention stresses that: "[c]ontracting States
shall cooperate for the prevention and suppression of terrorist

offences.

.

..

"59

Furthermore, Article 6 of the Gulf Cooperation Council CounterTerrorism Agreement (GCCCTA), 60 requires all state parties to, inter
alia, prevent the recruitment of nationals for terrorism purposes. The
contracting states must "work towards the prevention of any chance of
enticing any of its nationals to join any unlawful groups, or involvement
."61 This is a self-imposed
in any terror activities under any pretext ..
obligation by the state parties to prevent their citizens from being
recruited by criminal groups, and/or from participating in any terror
activities, under any pretext.
Meanwhile, the President of the Iraqi Parliament, Saleem Aljuburi,
speaking before the parliament in his comments on the events of Anbar
on 18th April 2015 said: "we will not allow the expulsion of Daesh.
Instead, we will destroy it so that it will not be a virus that moves into our
neighbours,' for that we care about the security of the brothers as we do
for the security of Iraq. Thus, they should lend similar support both direct
55. OAS Convention on Terrorism 1999, supra note 36, at 195.
56. See, e.g., ICSFT, supra note 42, at 11.
57. ACST, supra note 33, at 4-5.
58. Id. at 5.
59. Id.
60. The Gulf Cooperation Council Counter-Terrorism Agreement, July 24, 2008, Issued in
Kuwait by Decree No. 27 http://www.almeezan.qa/AgreementsPage.aspx?id=1231&languag
e=ar [hereinafter GCCCTA].
61. Id. art. 6.
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and indirect.... 62

This determination bears some important connotations, among which
that Iraq is vowing to fulfil its obligations under international law to
prevent and suppress terrorism. Prevention here includes preventing
terrorists from fleeing into other states, which would endanger the State's
security. As the President of the Parliament said, one would expect that
other states would also do their part to prevent and suppress terrorism in
order to help Iraq.
The test is whether the state of nationality/residence of the individual
fighting in Iraq has fulfilled all of its requirements under international law
in detecting, preventing and suppressing terrorism. These requirements
are related to terrorism committed by any individual wherever that
maybe. Thus, if a state has many residents/nationals committing terrorism
in Iraq, it could be queried whether it had fulfilled its duties under
international law to detect, prevent, or suppress terrorism committed by
such persons. There is no doubt that this duty is not confined to state of
nationality/residency. However, it is given that the state of nationality/
residency is practically the most relevant state when it comes to detecting
and preventing individuals from travelling to join terrorist groups. There
is no doubt that the state of nationality/residency is in a better position to
do so. Thus, failing to exhibit that it has done everything possible to fulfill
its duties in this regard could give rise to its responsibility under
international law for failing to detect, prevent and suppress certain
terrorist acts.
D. Obligation to Improve Domestic Legislations and Establish
Jurisdictionover Terrorism
Part of the counter-terrorism measures that states must take is to
amend domestic legislations to establish jurisdiction over terrorist acts.
For example, article 5 of the ICSANT provides that each state party is
required to: "(a) ...establish as criminal offences under its national law

the offences set forth in article 2; and (b) . . .make those offences
punishable by appropriate63 penalties which take into account the grave
nature of these offences."
Equally, Article 4 of the66ICSFT 64 and Article 4 of the ICSTB 65 both
provide similar provisions.
62. Parliament Website, President of Iraqi Parliament's Media Office, 18 Apr. 2015
(accessed in June 23, 2015), http://ar.parliament.iq/.
63. ICSANT, supranote 43, at 5.
64. ICSFT, supra note 42, at 4.
65. ICSTB, supranote 29, at 4.
66. In fact, even the wordings of these articles are almost identical. The only difference
was that in the 2005 convention the word "domestic law" was replaced by "national law."
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Articles 7 of the ICSFT,67 6 of the ICSTB,68 and 9 of the ICSANT,
consistently provide that each state party shall:
1.... take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the offences set forth... when:
(c) The offence is committed by a national of that State.
2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such
offence when:
has his or
(c) The offence is committed by a stateless person who
69
her habitual residence in the territory of that State ....
These two points clearly establish an obligation upon the state to take
the burden of prosecuting terrorists, partly because they are nationals or
residents of that state. Even if the terrorist act was not committed on its
territory nor linked to it at any stage of preparation, the state of
nationality/residency is still responsible for establishing jurisdiction over
such individuals.
The state's responsibility to ensure prosecutability of terrorists went
even beyond the cases where the offender is a national or a resident to
include those present on its territory after the offence was committed in
some cases. In fact, Article 9(4) of the ICSANT convention requires
states "to establish its jurisdiction over the offences ...

in cases where

the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite that
person to any of the States Parties which have established their
jurisdiction in accordance...." 70 Thus, it is the responsibility of the state
to ensure that terrorist acts are prosecutable even if the person present on
its territory was not classified as a resident or a national before
committing the offence.
Similar, and sometimes identical, provisions are also found in regional
CTC. For example, the E.U. ECST convention, in its article 671 requires
each state party to take all measures necessary including introducing new
legislations, to ensure that terrorist offenders are either extradited or
immediately prosecuted whenever they are present on its territory.
Correspondingly, the article 6 72of 1999 African convention CPCT binds
states with similar obligations.
The above provisions clearly ascertain that the duty of the state party
to establish its jurisdiction over terrorist acts committed by its
nationals/residents (sometimes even by visitors) abroad is an
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

ICSFT, supra note 42, at 5.
ICSTB, supra note 29, at 5-6.
ICSANT, supra note 43, at 6.
Id.
European Union Convention, supra note 35, at 95.
OAU Convention on Terrorism 1999, supra note 36, art. 6.
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international obligation. Therefore, not establishing such jurisdiction
would constitute a breach of an international legal obligation on the part
of the state party in question. An affected state may claim that fulfilling
such obligations would have prevented the nationals of the failing state
from joining a terrorist group to start with. It could argue that fulfilling
such obligations would have deterred some, as they would know that they
would face prosecution as soon as they return.
In addition, some conventions have obliged state parties to recognize
a list of acts as terrorist acts. This also obliges state parties to consider
them as part of the crimes included in their domestic law as soon as the
convention is signed. SAARC's RCST convention, for example, dictates
that "conduct constituting any of the following offences, according to the
law of the Contracting State, shall be regarded as terroristic .... 73
Furthermore, the Commonwealth of Independent States in article 4(1)
of their CTC agreed that "[i]n cooperating in combating acts of terrorism,
including in relation to the extradition of persons committing them,
the
' 74
Parties shall not regard the acts involved as other than criminal.
Therefore, in principle, if Iraq is to submit a claim against any of the
states from which nationals or residents have joined Daesh claiming that
this state has not established jurisdiction over the related crimes, this
would be a way of holding that state responsible to a certain extent. This
is especially so if such persons return to that state and it took no measures
to prosecute them for the crimes they committed in Iraq claiming that it
has no jurisdiction over such crimes.
E. Obligationto Investigate, Arrest, Prosecute, or Extradite
TerroristSuspects
Related conventions seem to have a tradition of requiring all state
parties to ensure that perpetrators of terrorist acts are arrested, prosecuted,
or extradited as appropriate. Even when the state is not willing to
extradite such persons, it is under obligation to prosecute them
immediately and ensure that they receive severe punishments
proportionate to the gravity of the crime they committed. This applies
whether the offender is a national, resident, or even a visitor to that state.
For example, article 10(2) of the ICSANT 75 requires the state in which a
perpetrator of a terrorist act is present to either prosecute or extradite
him/her without any delay.
Moreover, article 7(1-2) of the ICSTB convention7 6 and article 7(4)

73.

SAARC, supra note 44, at 1.

74.

Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, supra note 45, at 3.

75.
76.

ICSANT, supra note 43, at 7.
ICSTB, supra note 29, at 6.
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of the ICSFT convention 77 agree with article 11(1) of the ICSANT
convention which provides that:
[t]he State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is
present shall ...

,

if it does not extradite that person, be obliged,

without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was
committed in its territory, to submit the case without undue delay
to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through
proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those
authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the
any other offence of a grave nature under the law of that
case of
78
State.
Furthermore, states are under obligation to aid each other and fully
cooperate at all stages leading to the prosecution of terrorists including
exchange of information in relation to investigation, arrest, extradition
and prosecution. There is no doubt that when at these various stages
(investigation, arrest, extradition or prosecution) the support of the state
of nationality/residency cannot be underestimated.
Lack of cooperation on behalf of the state of residence/nationality is
in breach of most CTC. For example, similar to article 10(1) of the
ICSTB79 and article 12(1) of ICSFT,8 ° article 14(1) of the ICSANT
convention dictates that: "States Parties shall afford one another the
greatest measure of assistance in connection with investigations or
criminal or extradition proceedings brought in respect of the offences set
forth in article 2, including assistance 81in obtaining evidence at their
disposal necessary for the proceedings."
Regional treaties have also included similar provisions. For example,
article 7 of the ECST convention 82 requires the state in which a
perpetrator is present to take all necessary measures to either extradite or
prosecute the offender immediately. Similar provisions are also found in
the Arab ACST convention
in its article 3(11:1)83 and in article 4(2)(h) of
84
convention.
CPCT
the
There is no doubt that the state of nationality/residency is in a strong
position (both legally and practically) to cooperate. Legally because of
the established authority and legal relationship with the individual as a
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

ICSFT, supra note 42, at 5-6.
ICSANT, supra note 43, at 8.
ICSTB, supra note 29, at 9.
ICSFT, supra note 42, at 8.
ICSANT, supra note 43, at 9.
European Union Convention, supra note 35, at 95-96.
ACST, supra note 33, at 4.
OAU Convention on Terrorism 1999, supra note 36, at 209.
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national or a resident; and practically because such a state would be in a
stronger position than other states to provide useful information and
intelligence with regards to the investigation, arrest, prosecution or
extradition operations.

In some cases, states are required to extradite the person whether or
not s/he has a citizenship or residential status in that state. Thus, states
cannot claim that they can no longer be held responsible if the national or
resident changed nationality or residency status.
All states on whose territory there is a terrorist returning from Iraq are
under obligation to either extradite or prosecute them for the terrorism
crimes they committed whilst in Iraq.
F. Obligationto Improve Security Methods and Establish Strong
Databaseson Terrorism
Most recent CTC emphasize the need for establishing intelligence
databases on terrorism. States are required to use the advancement of
technology to the best possible level to gather information related to
terrorism and share this information effectively. Such provisions are
described in some detail in some CTC. For example, article 3 of the Arab
convention ACST clearly expects states:
4. To develop and strengthen systems concerned with surveillance
procedures and the securing of borders and points of entry
overland and by air in order to prevent illicit entry thereby...
7. To reinforce security-related information activities and to
coordinate them with those of each State...
8. To establish, in each Contracting State, a database for the
accumulation and analysis of information relating to terrorist
elements, groups, movements and organizations and for the
monitoring of developments with respect to the terrorist
phenomenon and of successful experiences in counter terrorism,
and to keep such information up to date and make85it available to
the competent authorities of Contracting States...
In the same line, article 9(6) of the GCCCTA requires each member
of the Gulf Council to establish an advanced anti-terror database for
terror-related information and cooperation between relevant security
bodies. 86 This treaty gained prominence when it required states to invest
in the advancement of technology to monitor, conduct surveillance and
track terror groups and their activities. It requires all state parties to build
a database to collect information and gather data on terror suspects, terror
85.
86.

ACST, supra note 33, at 4.
GCCCTA, supra note 60, at 9(6).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol29/iss2/1

20

Bashir: State Responsibility for Involvement of Nationals and Residents i
STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONALS AND RESIDEN7S

groups and their members as well as monitoring terror activities and
tactics and studying the best ways to counter-terrorism. The state parties
are required to keep track of up-to-date information and pass them to the
relevant authorities in other state parties for effective control and
prevention operations.
Sometimes conventions went into some details, which are very useful,
but at the same time increase the burden on states. For example, article
3(11) of the Arab ACST convention requires states to: "establish effective
cooperation between the relevant agencies and the public in countering
terrorism by, inter alia, establishing appropriate guarantees and
incentives to encourage the reporting of terrorist acts, the provision of
in their investigation, and cooperation in the arrest
information to assist
87
perpetrators."
of
Similar provisions are found in other regional conventions (e.g.,
article 4(2)(i) of the CPCT convention).88 Just as useful as other measures
identified in this article, engaging the public can be very helpful in
detecting and preventing terrorism and in investigating and prosecuting
terrorism offences. In fact, some might argue that this is one of the most
effective tools against terrorism. State parties, who fail to do so, should
find it hard to claim that they did all that is required to prevent their
nationals from-eventually--committing acts of terrorism abroad. If Iraq
is to submit a claim against the state of nationality/residence of a terrorist
operating on its territory, it could claim that the relevant state had taken
no measure to engage the public to cooperate. Such an engagement may
have been able to warn about the act of terrorism the individual in
question committed in Iraq pre-emptively. This is especially true as it is
undeniable that engaging the public has led in many cases to learning
about terrorist activities. As a counter-terrorism intelligence source puts
it: "[a]bout 70-80 percent of our intelligence comes from open sourcesthose open to the public-such as the newspaper, media, internet, public,
and community."89

Clearly, it is not enough for a state to claim that it had not known about
a large number of nationals/residents who travelled to Iraq and joined
terrorist groups. The state of nationality/residence has to prove that it was
using all available technological advancements and that it was
proactively attempting to gather such information. It would also need to
prove that it was not able to communicate the available information it had
in relation to terrorist acts committed by nationals/residents abroad.
Some might argue that the technological advancement available to
one state is not the same for another. While this might be true, the fair
87. ACST, supra note 33, at 5.
88. OAU Convention on Terrorism 1999, supra note 36, at 209-10.
89. K. JACK RILEY, STATE AND LocAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 41 (Kevin
Jack Riley et al. eds., 2005).
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measurement would be to assess the technologies the same state uses for
its own security and see if it failed to use the same for the security of
others. For the purpose of illustration, in 2015 the United Kingdom traced
three of its nationals in Syria and claimed that it had known about their
plans to launch terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom. 90 Thus, for
example, if a claim is to be launched by Iraq against the United Kingdom,
the latter will have to prove that it had used the same level of technology
and intelligence it used in this incident to track nationals/residents
fighting in Iraq and communicate such information to Iraq. Claiming that
it had not been able to track any would be hard to prove, against the fact
that it had been able to do so for its own security.
G. Obligation to Cooperate,Exchange Information, and
CoordinateAction
Most CTC include provisions requiring state parties to effectively and
promptly communicate all available information that can be useful in
detecting, preventing, suppressing, or prosecuting terrorism. For
example, article 18 of the ICSFT 91 necessitates that state parties must
fully cooperate by exchanging relevant information that could help
prevent offences outlined in the convention. Likewise, article 7 of the
ICSANT provides that each state party is required to cooperate by:
(b) Exchanging accurate and verified information...,

and

coordinating administrative and other measures taken ... to detect,

prevent, suppress and investigate the offences set forth in article
2 ....

In particular, a State Party shall take appropriate measures

in order to inform without delay the other States... in respect of
the commission of the offences set forth in article 2 as well as
preparations to commit such offences about which it has
learned.... 92

States are therefore clearly required to be proactive in informing other
states about possible terrorist activities. To start with, not attempting to
gather such information would be in violation of this Article. States must
be alert and take the initiative to use intelligence and every possible
technological advancement to gather the information and then
communicate it in an immediate manner to states that could benefit from
it in preventing, suppressing, or prosecuting terrorism. Therefore, it goes
without saying that states must do everything possible to gather
90. Jonathan Beale, Islamic State Conflict: Two Britons Killed in RAF Syria Strike, B.B.C.
(Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34178998.
91. ICSFT, supra note 42, at 11.
92. ICSANT, supra note 43, at 5.
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information about nationals and residents in the first instances wherever
they are. This is because the state is in the best position both legally and
practically to do so. Clearly, the state would be in breach of this obligation
if, for example, it claimed that it had not known about nationals or
residents who were preparing for a terrorist attack abroad, when it should
have known about such cases. More so, the breach of obligation would
be obvious if the state had known and did not notify the affected state
about it in a timely manner.
The only limitation to the requirement of this article is explained in
paragraph (3) where it provides: "States Parties shall not be required by
this Convention to provide any information which they are not permitted
to communicate pursuant to national law or which would jeopardize the
security of the State concerned or the physical protection of nuclear
material. ' ,93 Yet, in many cases, it would be difficult for the state of
nationality/residency to claim that this exception applies. For example,
when a certain state is aware of a citizen who travelled to Iraq for
suspicious reasons months ago and is aware of his or her location in Iraq
through intercepting phone calls he or she has made to family and friends,
this state must inform Iraq about all available information. For example,
if such a person is found to be staying in an area controlled by terrorist
groups, 94 this makes it hard for the state to claim that there was no link
between his or her travel and terrorism, thus making it hard for the state
to avoid responsibility if it does not pass all relevant information to Iraq.
Regionally, many CTC have expressly required state parties to
cooperate and offer all available information to the affected state in order
to help the latter to suppress terrorism. For example, article 8 of the
SAARC RCST convention stipulates that:
1. Contracting States shall, . . . afford one another the greatest

measure of mutual assistance in connection with proceedings
brought in respect of the offences referred to in Article I .. .
including the supply of all evidence at their disposal necessary for
the proceedings.
2. Contracting States shall cooperate among themselves .
through consultations between appropriate agencies, exchange of
information, intelligence and expertise and such other cooperative
measures . . .with a view to prevention of terroristic activities

93. Id.
94. Some states describe such areas in detail and publish them so that citizens and nationals
can avoid travelling to them. For example, Australia describes such areas as 'Declared area
offence' and makes them available for the public. Australian Government, Australian National
Security, 'Declared Area Offence,' https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/WhatAustraliaisdoing/
Pages/DeclaredAreaOffence.aspx (last visited June 6, 2016).
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through precautionary measures. 9 5
Article 3, section 1(2) of the Arab CTC ACST included similar
provisions requiring states parties to: 96 "cooperate and coordinate action
among Contracting States, particularly neighbouring countries suffering
from similar or common terrorist offences." 97 Meanwhile, article 4,
section 1(4) requires state parties to communicate all information that
may:
a. Assist in the arrest of a person or persons accused of committing
a terrorist offence against the interests of that State or of being
implicated in such an offence whether by aiding and abetting,
collusion or incitement;
b. Lead to the seizure of any weapons, munitions or explosives or
any devices or funds used or intended for use to commit a terrorist
98
offence.
It should be noted here that similar provisions are also found in article
5(1) and (2) of the 1999 CPCT African Union's CTC.99
Nevertheless, the provisions in the previous Arab Convention article
can be relied upon in establishing that every state party has a
responsibility to warn the state on which territory a terrorist act is about
to be carried out by nationals or residents of the former. The affected state
must be warned about such dangers before those nationals or residents
enter its territory if possible. As Iraq is party to this convention, all other
Arab states bear the responsibility to warn Iraq and cooperate with it as
soon as possible. States from where foreign terrorists fighting in Iraq have
come are under international legal obligation to warn Iraq in advance so
that it can take necessary steps to prevent terrorist crimes when possible.
If any state party fails to do so, it could be held responsible for breaching
its obligations. We can see that paragraph 3 of article 4(I) clearly requires:
Contracting States shall undertake to cooperate with each other in
the exchange of information for the suppression of terrorist
offences and promptly to notify other Contracting States of all the
information or data in their possession that may prevent the
occurrence of terrorist offences in their territory, against their

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

SAARC, supra note 44, at 5.
ACST, supra note 33, at 3.
Id.
Id. at 5.
OAU Convention on Terrorism 1999, supranote 36, at 210.
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nationals or residents or against their interests. 100
Thus, the ACST clearly establishes that the international
responsibility of the state in relation to its residents, and more pressingly
its responsibility in relation to terrorist activities by its citizens (nationals)
whether residents or living abroad, is inherent. The same articles also
mention a number of obligations upon state parties related to facilitating
counter-terrorism mechanisms. This can clearly be seen in the provisions
of article 3 of the ACST. 10 1 The exchange of information is required both
before and after the commission of the terror offence. The provisions of
article 4 of this ACST dictate that:
2. Each Contracting State shall undertake to notify any other
Contracting State in an expeditious manner of the information it
has concerning any terrorist offence that takes place in its territory
and is intended to harm the interests of that State or of its nationals
and to include in such notification statements concerning the
circumstances surrounding the offence, those who committed it, its
victims, the losses occasioned by it and the devices and methods
used in its perpetration, to the extent compatible
with the
02
inquiry.1
and
investigation
the
of
requirements
Furthermore, article 9 of the GCCCTA clarifies that for the sake of
fulfilling the aim of this agreement, state-parties are obliged to exchange
information and details relating to threats, risks, probabilities and
anticipations related to terror crimes. 103 Furthermore, states have the
obligation to report about members of terror groups or persons suspected
to have been in contact with such members. The article also requires the
exchange of information in an immediate manner about any terror
activities directed against a state-party whether inside their territories or
beyond, and all investigation results as well as the identity of the suspects
must be communicated. Immediate exchange of all information related to
tactics and tools used by terrorists and methods used to counter them as
well as all information and expertise used in counter-terrorism should be
exchanged. 04
There is no doubt that state parties to the above conventions must have
both established a database and have been collecting information, and
100.
101.
102.

ACST, supra note 33, at 5.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5. It should be noted here that similar provisions are found in art. 4(1,2) and art.

5 of the 1999 African Union's Counter Terrorism Treaty. Organization of African Unity, OAU
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, July 14, 1999, at 208-11.
103. GCCCTA, supra note 60, at 9(1).
104. Id. at 9(4).
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that they have been cooperating consistently in the manner prescribed in
these documents. Therefore, the state party whose citizens or residents
have been fighting in Iraq for the months and years is assumed to have
gathered (at least) some information in relation to these citizens. The
minimum requirement is for these states to communicate with Iraq and
pass all available information to the Iraqi authorities so that counter-terror
operations can benefit from such information. For example, Saudi Arabia
10 5
is said to have a large percentage of Daesh fighters as its citizens.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon it to cooperate with Iraq by exchanging
all information that can help Iraq in counter-terrorism operations.
The treaties studied above clearly identify the responsibility of the
state party in relation to its nationals and residents when they are involved
in terror activities in another state's territory. The related provisions of
these treaties must be understood in light of the fact that today's
technology advancement made it easy for states to keep track of nationals
and residents wherever they move and whenever they are involved in
suspicious criminal activities.
Breaching any of the obligations above would give rise to state
responsibility due to a breach of contractual obligation. Under
international law, this is enough of a source of obligation and such
breaches are enough of a source of state responsibility towards those
affected. There is no need for further proof, yet the U.N. Security Council
(UNSC) acting under Chapter VII produced many binding resolutions
reinforcing the above obligations, as we shall see next.
V. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

The UNSC treated terrorism as a major threat to world peace and
security. 10 6 Thus, and as the problem of terrorism is not shrinking, the
UNSC continues to produce various solutions on this matter. 10 7 The
UNSC resolutions are vital as they reinforce established state obligations
and create new obligations incumbent upon all states to counter-terrorism
at the same time. While the law of treaties in most cases binds states
parties only, the UNSC resolutions in relation to terrorism are usually
issued under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Therefore, all U.N.
105. Ashley Kirk, Iraq and Syria: How Many Foreign Fightersare Fightingfor ISIL?,
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/29/iraq-and-syria-howmany-foreign-fighters-are-fighting-for-isil/.
106. S.C. Res. 2178, para. 1 (Sept. 24, 2014); Robert Muggah, Terrorism is on the Rise But There's a Bigger Threat We're Not Talking About, WORLD EcoNoMc FORUM (Apr. 8, 2016),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/04/terrorism-is-on-the-rise-but-there-s-a-bigger-threat-w
e-re-not-talking-about/.
107. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 106; Muggah, supra note 106.
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Member States are bound by such resolutions.
The UNSC produced vital decisions such as Res. 1371 (26th Sep
2001)1 °8 and Res. 1566 (2004). 1°9 Noticeably, some recent resolutions
have focused on the phenomenon of foreign fighters. For example, in Res.
1373 the UNSC required all states to:
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive,
to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by
suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and
eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;
(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist
acts, including by provision of early warning to other States by
exchange of information;
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit
terrorist acts, or provide safe havens;
(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist
acts from using their respective territories for those purposes
against other States or their citizens;
(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing,
planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in
supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in
addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are
established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and
regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness
of such terrorist acts;
(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in
connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings
relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including
assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for
the proceedings;
(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by
effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity
papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing
counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and
travel documents. "10
In all clarity, the UNSC in this resolution reinforces the counterterrorism state obligations enshrined in the law of treaty, as demonstrated
above. In addition, this resolution emphasizes a specific duty to prevent
foreign fighters from travelling for terrorism purposes.
Clearly, the said resolution requires states to carry out a two-stage
108.
109.
110.

S.C. Res. 1371 (Sept. 26, 2001).
S.C. Res. 1566 (Oct. 8, 2004).
S.C. Res. 1373, § 2(a)-(f) (Sept. 28, 2001).
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operation of prevention and deterrence. For example, states whose
nationals/residents are fighting in Iraq have the duty to use every possible
method to track, trace and gather information about their subjects and to
communicate such information to the affected state(s), Iraq in this case.
In fact, the state of nationality/residency should prevent the travel of
suspected terrorists to prevent them from joining terrorist groups.
Fortunately, some states have already started to do so. 11 The state should
do everything possible to know the intention of such people and prevent
them before travelling. In cases where the prevention was not possible,
the national/residence state should help Iraq to bring those who have been
fighting there alongside terrorist groups to justice. If such persons return
to their state of nationality/residence, the latter is under obligation to
either prosecute these criminals or extradite them to the affected states so
that they can face justice.
Interestingly, the 1373 Res. also required all states to "[b]ecome
parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and
protocols relating to terrorism, including the International Convention 'for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999." l 2
The UNSC also held this view in its 1624 Res. (2005) in which it was:
Stressing its call upon all States to become party, as a matter of
urgency, to the international counter-terrorism Conventions and
Protocols whether or not they are party to regional Conventions on
the matter, and to consider signing the International Convention
for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism adopted by the General
Assembly on 13 April 2005."'
It is unusual, to say the least, for the UNSC to require states to become
a party (as a matter of urgency) to such conventions. 114 These UNSC's
binding resolutions require all states to prevent terrorist activities whether
committed by nationals or foreigners regardless of whether committed on
national territories or abroad. This requirement could lead to establishing
state responsibility for all terrorist activities planned/carried out by
nationals or residents at home and abroad. States should not be
able/allowed to easily rely on simple claims such as lack of knowledge,
lack of fellowship/connection or lack of causation to escape the
111. Recently states started to behave more responsibly in this regard. For example,
Australia is said to have been actively trying to prevent persons who are likely to join terrorist
group from travelling. Australian Counter-TerrorPolice 'Stopping 400 per Day,' BBC NEWS,

(Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-31900876.
112. S.C. Res. 1373, § 3(d) (Sept. 28, 2001).
113. S.C. Res. 1624, para. 11 (Sept. 14, 2005).
114. In fact, this is quite strange. Joining conventions is done by sovereign states through
their own will and conventions or treaties sign against their will might legally speaking be null
and void.
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responsibility for acts of terrorism carried out by nationals abroad, so long
as these nationals still hold its nationality whilst committing the terrorist
activity. This is because the international responsibility of the state is
determined at the time of carrying out the action not after or before it." 5
Therefore, claiming that the nationality of a terrorist has been dropped
should not allow the state to escape the responsibility. In such case, this
state would have failed its responsibility twice, firstly because of its
failure to fulfil its due diligence duty to prevent terror acts committed by
this national, and secondly because of its failure to cooperate
internationally among the state of origin, state of transit and the state of
destination, a requirement under UNSC Res. 2178 (2014).116 Acting
under Chapter VII, the UNSC in this resolution requires all states to:

11 ....

improve international, regional, and sub regional
cooperation... to prevent the travel of foreign terrorist fighters
from or through their territories, including through increased
sharing of information for the purpose of identifying foreign,
terrorist fighters, the sharing and adoption of best practices, and
improved understanding of the patterns of travel by foreign
terrorist fighters, and for Member States to act cooperatively when
taking national measures to prevent terrorists from exploiting
technology, communications and resources to incite support for
terrorist acts... 17
Furthermore, Res. 1373 required all states to launch an up-to-thelevel-of-threat campaign to improve its capabilities in legal and security
is
fields to counter-terrorism. Among the steps required by the resolution
1 18
the freezing of funds of all persons involved in terror activities.
Thus, the UNSC clearly engages all Members States and requires
them to act swiftly, cooperatively and sturdily to prevent the travel of
foreign terrorist fighters. This said, it is evident that states are primarily
responsible for the travel of nationals and residents as they have the best
legal and practical capabilities to fulfil the said duty in comparison to
other states. The state is naturally more capable of learning about the
intentions of nationals/residents travelling to join terrorism than any other
state. In fact, acting under Chapter VII as well, the UNSC bluntly
115. In fact, some counter-terrorism treaties such as the CTC of the Commonwealth
Independent States organization in article 4(2) provided that: "[t]he nationality of a person
accused of an act of terrorism shall be deemed to be his nationality at the time of commission of
the act." Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, "Treaty on Cooperation among
the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism."
116. S.C. Res. 2178, § 4 (Sept. 24, 2014).
117. Id. § 6.
118. S.C. Res. 1373, § l(c) (Sept. 28, 2001).
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mentioned residency and nationality states as key stakeholders who must
cooperate in order to prevent the movement of foreign terrorist fighters.
The UNSC in Res. 2178(13) clearly affirms that it: "3. Urges Member
States . . . to intensify and accelerate the exchange of operational

information regarding actions or movements of terrorists or terrorist
networks, including foreign terrorist fighters, especially with their States
of residence or nationality...
The positive cooperation duty required from states by the latter
resolution, clearly necessitates proper control of borders to check on
'foreign fighters' (as described by UNSC resolutions) to check their
identities and travel documents and prevent and suppress recruiting,
organizing, training or transporting persons who travel to countries other
than those whom they are nationals of or residents in to, organize, prepare
for, finance or carry out terror activities. The resolution also reiterated the
need for all Member States to ensure that their legislations are capable of
holding terrorists accountable, and that states are required to have
effective judicial systems in place to ensure that terrorists are held
accountable.
In light of the body of rules clearly embodied in many UNSC
resolutions issued under Chapter VII, it is hard to say that any state can
merely claim that terror activities carried out by nationals or residents
abroad have nothing to do with it. In fact, only when the state had done
everything possible and fulfilled its responsibilities under international
law to cooperate and do everything possible to prevent, suppress and
punish terrorism, it can then claim that it cannot be claimed against.
VI.CONCLUSION

There is no doubt of the fact that breaching international obligations
by a state would give rise to state responsibility. It is also given that
breaching obligations under conventions ratified by a state will give rise
to such responsibility. The same applies to breaches of obligations
stemming from Chapter VII based UNSC Resolutions. Consequently, as
it has been explained in this Article, states are under obligation to do
everything possible to detect, prevent, suppress and prosecute terrorism
regardless of who, where and when. We have explained that under
contemporary international law states have specific obligations in
fighting terrorism. For example, states have obligations to establish a
strong database and to communicate relevant information with relevant
states effectively and promptly to ensure that terrorism is detected,
prevented, suppressed or prosecuted whenever it is possible to do so. We
119.

S.C. Res. 2178, § 3 (Sept. 24, 2014).
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have also highlighted the fact that in fulfilling its duty the state has to be
proactive and use the best available methods, techniques and technologies
to counter-terrorism. These state obligations are required in the face of
all terrorism regardless of who commits it. However, as we have
demonstrated, it is more pressing for states of nationality and residency
to carry out such duties as they are in better legal and practical positions.
Therefore, failing to fulfil any of the counter-terrorism obligations under
international law, could give rise to state responsibility for acts of
terrorism committed by nationals and residents abroad. This is true, even
if they were not agents of the state in any capacity and even if the act has
no connection whatsoever to the territory of the state of
nationality/residence.
All obligations mentioned in this work apply to all states, even to the
few that might not have joined the conventions above. This is because the
UNSC has indeed reinforced every single law of treaties obligation in this
regard. This was done while acting under Chapter VII which makes it
incumbent upon all U.N. Member States to abide by.
As for the case study, it is clear that Iraq could request clarifications
from the states who have nationals or residents fighting terror wars on its
territory. The states of nationality/residence would then have to prove that
they have done everything possible to cooperate and to fulfil their
obligations under international law to be relieved from responsibility. The
test involved is that of due diligence and proving that all possible efforts
have been made to cooperate with Iraq. Otherwise, the states of
nationality/residence of foreign terrorist fighters could find themselves in
a position where they would have to deal with the consequences of their
intentional or unintentional negligence towards Iraq, for which they could
be held responsible under contemporary international law.
It could be argued that there are many cases in which it would be
difficult to determine whether the state should be held responsible even
if it fails to fulfil its duties under the law of treaties (e.g., if the country is
being controlled by powerful militias who disallow the state from
carrying out its duties in preventing terrorism). Nevertheless, the purpose
of this article is to prove that it is possible to hold states responsible for
such failure. More research will need to be done to counterpart this work
once it has been published.
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